# Parameterized Model Checking of Fault-tolerant Distributed Algorithms

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# Why fault-tolerant (FT) distributed algorithms

#### faults not in the control of system designer

- bit-flips in memory
- power outage
- disconnection from the network
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distributed algorithms intended to make systems more reliable even in the presence of faults

- replicate processes
- exchange messages
- do coordinated computation
- goal: keep replicated processes in "good state"







# Fault-tolerant distributed algorithms



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- *n* processes communicate by messages
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- f are actually faulty
- resilience conditions, e.g.,  $n > 3t \land t \ge f \ge 0$

# Fault-tolerant DAs: Model Checking Challenges

#### unbounded data types

counting how many messages have been received

#### • parameterization in multiple parameters

among *n* processes  $f \leq t$  are faulty with n > 3t

#### • contrast to concurrent programs

fault tolerance against adverse environments

degrees of concurrency

many degrees of partial synchrony

continuous time

fault-tolerant clock synchronization

# Importance of liveness in distributed algorithms

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Rich literature to verify safety (e.g. in concurrent systems)

Distributed algorithms perspective:

- "doing nothing is always safe"
- "tools verify algorithms that actually might do nothing"

# Model checking problem for fault-tolerant DA algorithms

- ullet given a distributed algorithm and spec.  $\varphi$
- system description:  $M(n,t,f) = P(n,t,f) \parallel P(n,t,f) \parallel \cdots \parallel P(n,t,f)$
- every M(n, t, f) is a system of n f correct processes
- show for all n, t, and f satisfying  $n > 3t \land t \ge f \ge 0$  $M(n, t, f) \models \varphi$



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- every M(n, t, f) is a system of N(n, t, f) correct processes
- show for all *n*, *t*, and *f* satisfying resilience condition  $M(n, t, f) \models \varphi$



## Properties in Linear Temporal Logic

Unforgeability (U). If  $v_i = 0$  for all correct processes *i*, then for all correct processes *j*, accept<sub>i</sub> remains 0 forever.

$$\mathbf{G}\left(\big(\bigwedge_{i=1}^{n-f}v_i=0\big)\to\mathbf{G}\;\left(\bigwedge_{j=1}^{n-f}accept_j=0\right)\right)$$

Completeness (C). If  $v_i = 1$  for all correct processes *i*, then there is a correct process *j* that eventually sets accept<sub>*i*</sub> to 1.

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Relay (R). If a correct process i sets accept<sub>i</sub> to 1, then eventually all correct processes j set accept<sub>i</sub> to 1.

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 Safety

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Threshold-guarded fault-tolerant distributed algorithms

# Threshold-guarded FTDAs

#### Fault-free construct: quantified guards (t=f=0)

Existential Guard

if received *m* from *some* process then ...

• Universal Guard

if received *m* from *all* processes then ...

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Fault-Tolerant Algorithms: *n* processes, at most *t* are Byzantine

• Threshold Guard

if received m from n-t processes then ...

• (the processes cannot refer to f!)

# Counting argument in threshold-guarded algorithms



Correct processes count distinct incoming messages

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# our abstractions at a glance



$$n = 6, t = 1, f = 1$$

$$t + 1 = 2, n - t = 5$$

#### nr. processes (counters)



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# Related work: $(0, 1, \infty)$ -counter abstraction

Pnueli, Xu, and Zuck (2001) introduced  $(0, 1, \infty)$ -counter abstraction:

- finitely many local states, e.g., {*N*, *T*, *C*}.
- abstract the number of processes in every state,

e.g.,  $K : C \mapsto \mathbf{0}, \quad T \mapsto \mathbf{1}, \quad N \mapsto$  "many".

• perfectly reflects mutual exclusion properties e.g.,  $G(K(C) \neq \text{``many''})$ .

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Our parametric data + counter abstraction:

- unboundendly many local states (nr. of received messages)
- finer counting of processes:

 $t+1\ {\rm processes}$  in a specific state can force global progress, while  $t\ {\rm processes}$  cannot

• mapping t, t + 1, and n - t to "many" is too coarse.

# Tool Chain: $\operatorname{ByMC}$



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# Concrete vs. parameterized (Byzantine case)



- Parameterized model checking performs well (the red line).
- Experiments for fixed parameters quickly degrade (n = 9 runs out of memory).
- We found counter-examples for the cases n = 3t and f > t, where the resilience condition is violated.

# Completeness threshold for bounded model checking

Fix a threshold automaton TA and a size function N.

#### Theorem

For each **p** with  $RC(\mathbf{p})$ , the diameter of an accelerated counter system is independent of parameters and is less than or equal to  $|E| \cdot (|C| + 1) + |C|$ :

- |E| is the number of edges in TA (self-loops excluded).
- |C| is the number of edge conditions in TA that can be unlocked (locked) by an edge appearing later (resp. earlier) in the control flow, or by a parallel edge.

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# Can we reach the bound with NuSMV?



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# Experimental setup





The tool (source code in OCaml),

the code of the distributed algorithms in Parametric Promela, and a virtual machine with full setup

are available at: http://forsyte.at/software/bymc

# Related work: PV of FTDAs

Regular model checking of fault-tolerant distributed protocols:

[Fisman, Kupferman, Lustig 2008]

- "First-shot" theoretical framework.
- No guards like  $x \ge t + 1$ , only  $x \ge 1$ .
- No implementation.
- Manual analysis applied to folklore broadcast (crash faults).

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Backward reachability using SMT with arrays:

[Alberti, Ghilardi, Pagani, Ranise, Rossi 2010-2012]

- Implementation.
- Experiments on Chandra-Toueg 1990.
- No resilience conditions like n > 3t.
- Safety only.

# Our current work

	Discrete synchronous	Discrete partially synchronous	Discrete asynchronous	Continuous synchronous	Continuous partially synchronous
	one-shot broadcast, c.b.consensus				
			core of {ST87,		
One instance/ finite payload			BT87, CT96},		
			MA06 (common),		
			MR04 (binary)		
Many inst./					
finite payload					
Many inst./ unbounded					
pavload					
Messages with					
reals					

# Future work: threshold guards + orthogonal features



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Parameterized Model Checking of FTDAs

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# Thank you!

[ http://forsyte.at/software/bymc ]



Concrete  $t + 1 \le x$ 



Concrete  $t + 1 \le x$  is abstracted as  $x = I_{t+1} \lor x = I_{n-t}$ .



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Concrete x' = x + 1,



Concrete  $t + 1 \le x$  is abstracted as  $x = I_{t+1} \lor x = I_{n-t}$ .

Concrete x' = x + 1, is abstracted as:  $x = I_0 \quad \land \ x' = I_1 \dots$ 

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Concrete  $t + 1 \le x$  is abstracted as  $x = I_{t+1} \lor x = I_{n-t}$ .

 $\begin{array}{ll} \text{Concrete } x' = x+1, \ \text{is abstracted as:} \\ x = I_0 & \land \ x' = I_1 \\ \lor x = I_1 & \land \left(x' = I_1 \quad \lor x' = I_{t+1}\right) \ldots \end{array}$ 



Concrete  $t + 1 \le x$  is abstracted as  $x = I_{t+1} \lor x = I_{n-t}$ .

Concrete x' = x + 1, is abstracted as:  $x = I_0 \land x' = I_1$   $\lor x = I_1 \land (x' = I_1 \lor x' = I_{t+1})$  $\lor x = I_{t+1} \land (x' = I_{t+1} \lor x' = I_{n-t}) \dots$ 



Concrete  $t + 1 \le x$  is abstracted as  $x = I_{t+1} \lor x = I_{n-t}$ .

Concrete x' = x + 1, is abstracted as:  $x = I_0 \land x' = I_1$   $\lor x = I_1 \land (x' = I_1 \lor x' = I_{t+1})$   $\lor x = I_{t+1} \land (x' = I_{t+1} \lor x' = I_{n-t})$  $\lor x = I_{n-t} \land x' = I_{n-t}$ 

# Parametric abst. refinement — uniformly spurious paths

#### Classical CEGAR:



# Parametric abst. refinement — uniformly spurious paths





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Parameterized Model Checking of FTDAs

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